

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000700100013-5

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1. THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON THE PROCESS OF COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS EXPERIMENT AND THE EFFECT OF PUBLICITY ON THE EFFORT. 4

2. IN EARLY MAY OF 1976 THE DEPUTY TO THE DCI FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AT THAT TIME MR. GEORGE CARVER, MET WITH MR. ROBERT GALVIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE ESTIMATES EVALUATION COMMITTEE OF PFIAB, TO DISCUSS IN GREATER DETAIL THE METHODS, PROCEDURES, AND OBJECTIVES FOR CONDUCTING THE EXPERIMENT. THE AGREEMENT FINALLY WORKED OUT BETWEEN MR. BUSH AND LEO CHERNE, AND COORDINATED WITH GEN. SCOWCROFT, HAD THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS: 4

A. THE 1976 ESTIMATE OF SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK WOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED COMMUNITY PRACTICES. THOSE WORKING ON THE ESTIMATE WOULD BE REFERRED TO AS THE "A" TEAMS. 4

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B. IN ADDITION, WITH RESPECT TO THE THREE KEY ISSUES SELECTED BY THE DCI IN CONSULTATION WITH GEN. SCOWCROFT, "B" TEAMS WOULD BE FORMED OF EXPERTS INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT. THESE PERSONS SHOULD HAVE EXPERT KNOWLEDGE IN THE APPROPRIATE FIELDS, WHO HAVE OR CAN BE GRANTED THE NECESSARY SECURITY CLEARANCES, BUT WHO ARE NOT THEMSELVES ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE BASIC COMMUNITY ESTIMATE. 4

C. THE "A" AND "B" TEAMS WOULD HAVE THE SAME BODY OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM AND ADHERE TO THE SAME PRODUCTION SCHEDULE. DURING THE COURSE OF THE STUDIES, THE TEAMS WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTERACT ON THEIR FINDINGS -- NOT TO STRIKE COMPROMISES OR REACH CONSENSUS JUDGMENTS BUT TO EXPLAIN AND DEFEND THEIR FINDINGS BEFORE THEIR PEERS. 4

D. FINAL "A" AND "B" DRAFTS WOULD THEN BE PRODUCED, WITH EACH TEAM PREPARING COMMENTS ON THE OTHER'S FINDINGS. THE ENTIRE PACKAGE WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NFIB. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ESTIMATE WAS TO BE HANDLED IN STANDARD WAYS. THE "B" TEAM STUDIES AND THE "A" AND "B" TEAM COMMENTS ON EACH OTHER'S

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WORK WOULD BE PACKAGED SEPARATELY AND FORWARDED ONLY TO SELECTED RECIPIENTS -- AMONG WHOM WILL BE THE PFIAB AND THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. 4

E. LATER, THE ASST. TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE DCI AND PFIAB, WOULD REVIEW THE EXPERIMENT AND CRITIQUE ITS RESULTS. 4

3. AS YOU KNOW, MR. BUSH DESIGNATED [REDACTED] AS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR AND MANAGER FOR THIS EXPERIMENT. [REDACTED] ROLE WAS TO PROVIDE A CENTRAL FOCUS AND SUPPORT FOR THE "B" TEAMS -- WITH A RESPONSIBILITY TO FOLLOW SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS BUT NOT TO INTERVENE IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETITIVE TEAMS. THE THREE TOPICS FOR STUDY WERE SELECTED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE NSC STAFF AND THE ESTIMATES EVALUATION COMMITTEE OF PFIAB. THESE WERE SOVIET ICBM ACCURACY, SOVIET LOW ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY, AND SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICY AND OBJECTIVES. GUIDANCE ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE "B" TEAMS WAS RECEIVED FROM THE PFIAB AND THE TEAMS WERE STRUCTURED TO CONFORM REASONABLY CLOSELY TO THOSE GUIDELINES.

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4. AS THIS PFIAB VISUALIZED IT, THE EXPERIMENT WAS DESIGNED TO TEST THE HYPOTHESES--USING THE SAME EVIDENCE AS THAT AVAILABLE TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--THAT EITHER THE RANGE OF UNCERTAINTY AROUND SELECTED SOVIET THREAT PARAMETERS {ICBM ACCURACY, LOW ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES} WAS SUCH THAT THE THREAT COULD BE GREATER THAN THAT REFLECTED IN THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES OR--IN THE CASE OF THE ESTIMATE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES--THAT SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES ARE, IN FACT, MORE AMBITIOUS AND THEREFORE IMPLICITLY MORE THREATENING TO U.S. SECURITY THAN THEY APPEAR TO THE AUTHORS OF THE NIES. IN ORDER NOT TO BE CHARGED WITH PREJUDICING THE RESULTS THE DCI CHARGED THE MANAGER OF THE EXPERIMENT TO ASSUME A NEUTRAL ROLE IN THE ANALYSES. GUIDANCE ON THE SELECTION OF TEAM LEADERS WAS RECEIVED AND ACCEPTED FROM THE ESTIMATES EVALUATION COMMITTEE OF THE PFIAB AND THE TEAM LEADERS THEN HAD THE DOMINANT ROLE IN SELECTING AND RECRUITING THEIR ASSOCIATES. THE TEAMS WERE ADVISED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ESTIMATES EVALUATION COMMITTEE OF PFIAB, MR. GALVIN, THAT THEY WERE NOT TO FEEL OBLIGED TO FIT THE

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EVIDENCE TO A PREDETERMINED CONCLUSION IF, IN FACT, THEIR ANALYSES INDICATED OTHERWISE. THE TEAMS WERE -- NONETHELESS -- MADE UP OF ANALYSTS OF SOVIET MILITARY MATTERS WHOSE PAST VIEWS WERE KNOWN TO HAVE COINCIDED WITH THE HYPOTHESES BEING EXAMINED. THE EXPERIMENT CONSEQUENTLY WAS NOT REALLY BALANCED, IN THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE "C" TEAMS WHO WOULD SYMPATHETICALLY EXAMINE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO EVALUATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH AND PURPOSES MORE BENIGN THAN EITHER THE COMMUNITY OR THE "B" TEAM STUDIES. 4

5. THE SELECTION OF TEAMS TO STUDY ONLY THE MORE SOMBER HYPOTHESES WAS DONE PRIMARILY OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR PFIAB'S EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE THREAT HAD BEEN UNDERSTATED IN THE NIES. IT IS ALSO TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT ON THESE ISSUES THE DOMINANT VIEWS WERE IN FACT MORE POLARIZED THAN MULTI-VALUED. IN RESTROSPET, HOWEVER, WE DID NOT FULLY FORESEE THE PROBABILITY THAT THE TEAM "B" EXPERIMENT WOULD GENERATE SUCH PRESSURES FOR PUBLICITY IN THE MEDIA AND COINCIDE WITH INCREASING PUBLIC ACTIVITY BY THOSE WHO ARE ALARMED ABOUT THE EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE.

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6. THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS EXPERIMENT WERE RELATIVELY WIDELY KNOWN IN WASHINGTON BY MID-SUMMER -- BUT IN A CLASSIFIED CONTEXT -- AND ALL THE PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN CAUTIONED ABOUT THE DAMAGE THAT COULD BE DONE BY UNAUTHORIZED PRESS LEAKS. AS YOU KNOW, HOWEVER, THE "BOSTON GLOBE" AND THE "WASHINGTON STAR" ON OCT 20 PUBLISHED IDENTICAL ARTICLES BY WILLIAM BEECHER WHICH PROVIDED THE OUTLINE AND SOME OF THE ESSENTIAL DETAIL OF THE EXERCISE. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DISCOVER THE SOURCE OF THIS STORY. STRONG REPRESENTATIONS WERE MADE BY MR. BUSH TO ALL THE "A" AND "B" TEAM PARTICIPANTS CONCERNING THE NEGATIVE EFFECT SUCH PUBLICITY COULD HAVE ON THE UTILITY OF THE EXPERIMENT. MR. BUSH ALSO CONFERRED WITH DR. CHERNE, CHAIRMAN OF PFIAB, AND ASKED THAT THE PFIAB MEMBERS BE ADVISED OF HIS VIEWS CONCERNING THE DISUTILITY OF FURTHER EXPOSURE OF THE EXPERIMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. THE INDIVIDUAL PFIAB MEMBERS WERE REQUESTED TO USE ANY INFLUENCE THEY MIGHT HAVE WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE EXERCISE TO DISCOURAGE FURTHER LEADS TO THE PRESS. 4

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7. IT WAS ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED THAT THE BASIC NIE AND THE "B" TEAM STUDIES WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NFIB IN NOVEMBER AND THE RESULTS BRIEFED TO THE PFIAB AT THEIR DECEMBER MEETING -- THE LAST SCHEDULED BEFORE THE INAUGURATION. ALTHOUGH THE NFIB SCHEDULE FOR NIE 11-3/8-76 SLIPPED INTO DECEMBER, THE PFIAB STILL WANTED TO HEAR FROM BOTH THE COMMUNITY TEAMS AND THE "B" TEAMS ON THE RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT COMPLETED SO FAR. THE PFIAB FELT THAT THE EXERCISE WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO BEING COMPLETED THAT THEY SHOULD REPORT ON IT TO THE PRESIDENT AT THEIR LAST MEETING WITH HIM: Y

8. THE BRIEFING OF PFIAB TOOK PLACE ON 2 DECEMBER. THE INTENT WAS NOT TO PRESENT FINAL VIEWS BECAUSE THE PFIAB CHAIRMAN, DR. CHERNE, DID NOT WISH TO HAVE THE BOARD PASS JUDGMENT ON THE EXPERIMENT UNTIL ALL STAGES HAD BEEN COMPLETED. IT IS FAIR TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE BOARD WAS PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS ON BOTH SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS AND FOR WHAT IT REPRESENTED IN THE WAY OF BRINGING ALTERNATIVE OUTSIDE VIEWS TO BEAR ON THE ANALYTICAL PROCESS. Y

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9. A FEW DAYS AFTER THE PFIAB BRIEFING ANOTHER BEECHER ARTICLE ON THE EXPERIMENT WAS FEATURED IN THE BOSTON GLOBE. THIS ARTICLE WAS EVEN MORE EXPLICIT THAN THE ORIGINAL IN ITS INVIDIOUS HANDLING OF THE NATIONAL ESTIMATIVE PROCESS AND CIA IN PARTICULAR. SINCE THEN THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS ARTICLES BY BINDER {NY TIMES}, MARDER {WASHINGTON POST}, KRAFT {WASHINGTON POST}, AND OTHERS, WHICH HAVE BEGUN TO PLACE THE COMPETITIVE STUDY IN BETTER PERSPECTIVE. INCREASINGLY, IT APPEARS THAT THE POLITICIZATION OF THE PIPES' TEAM STUDY IS BEING RECOGNIZED FOR WHAT IT IS -- A DELIBERATE, ORCHESTRATED, AND ONE-SIDED VIEW OF A FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ISSUE. THIS IS RATHER DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED, WHICH WAS A CONTROLLED USE OF OUTSIDE SPECIALISTS FOR A PURELY INTERNAL METHODOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT. 4

10. ALMOST ALL OF THE PUBLICITY CONCERNING THE EXPERIMENT HAS BEEN CONFINED SO FAR TO THE REPORT OF THE TEAM DEALING WITH SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES. MUCH OF THIS HAS NOT BEEN VERY WELL INFORMED, AND IT HAS CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL MAKE DIFFICULT THE FINAL EVALUATION OF THE EXPERIMENT

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AGAINST THE ORIGINAL PURPOSES OF THE DCI AND PFIAB. IF ONE  
COULD SET ASIDE THE DIN AND CLAMOR OF THE PRESS AND THE DISTORTIONS  
SERVED UP FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE FAIR TO  
SAY THAT THE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE WORKED OUT IN MANY WAYS MUCH  
AS IT WAS ORIGINALLY SET UP TO DO. FOR THE MOST PART THE WORK OF  
THE "B" TEAMS -- PARTICULARLY ON THE TWO PURELY TECHNICAL TOPICS --  
WAS SERIOUSLY AND RESPONSIBLY DONE AND THE RESULTING DIFFERENCES  
OF VIEW WERE NOT TRIVIAL. THERE WAS SOME USEFUL INTERACTION  
AMONG THE TEAMS ON SUBSTANCE. IN PARTICULAR: 4

A. A GREATER EFFORT WAS MADE IN PREPARING THE ESTIMATE TO  
DOCUMENT CONCLUSIONS THOROUGHLY, TO BE PRECISE IN TERMINOLOGY  
{ESPECIALLY ABOUT SOVIET DOCTRINE}, AND TO AVOID GENERALIZATIONS  
ABOUT THE FUTURE WHICH WERE NOT SOLIDLY GROUNDED IN DEMONSTRABLE  
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS. 4

B. INCREASED CAUTION WAS INTRODUCED INTO ESTIMATIVE PREDICTIONS,  
FOR THE PERIOD 5 TO 10 YEARS HENCE, AND ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FUTURE  
CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET DEFENSES TO LIMIT PENETRATION AND DAMAGE.  
THIS CAUTION AROSE IN PART FROM EVIDENTIAL UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT

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THE FUTURE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSES, BUT ALSO IN PART FROM "B" TEAM ARGUMENTATION ABOUT THE SENSITIVITY OF CONCLUSIONS TO OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND RED-BLUE INTERACTIONS WHICH ARE INHERENTLY VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT AND REQUIRE DETAILED NET ASSESSMENT. 4

11. A MAJOR CONTENTIOUS ASPECT OF THE PIPES "B" TEAM REPORT, HOWEVER, WAS THAT MORE THAN HALF OF IT COMPRISED A SWEEPING CRITIQUE OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND METHODOLOGY OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS AND MORE DEALING WITH NIE TREATMENT OF MANY SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES. THIS FLOWED FROM A PERMISSIVENESS IN THE DCI/PFIAB AGREEMENT WHICH WAS INTERPRETED TO ALLOW THAT PARTICULAR "B" TEAM TO GO FAR BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ITS INITIAL EXPERIMENTAL TASK OF MAKING A PROFESSIONALLY RESPONSIBLE CASE THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES WERE MORE AMBITIOUS AND MORE DANGEROUS TO US INTERESTS THAN ESTIMATED IN NIES. THIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE EXCESSIVELY COMBATIVE AND POLITICALLY VOLATILE NATURE OF THE PIPES "B" TEAM REPORT, AND LENT ITSELF TO PRESS LEAKS DESIGNED TO DISCREDIT THE ESTIMATING PROCESS AND THE CIA. 4

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12. WHILE THE DCI'S VIEWS ABOUT SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS EXPRESSED IN THIS YEAR'S NIE ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF LASTYEAR, IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS THE BILLBOARD EFFECT OF SUCCESSIVE ESTIMATES HAS BEEN TO PRESENT AN INCREASINGLY STARK PRICTURE OF OVERALL SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES. THE DCI IS DETERMINED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE INCREASING CONCERN EXPRESSED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REFLECTS AN ACCUMULATION OF EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS ABOUT THE SCOPE, VIGOR AND PERSISTENCE OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE PROGRAMS IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD. HE IS EQUALLY DETERMINED TO REBUFF ALLEGATIONS THAT THESE INTELLIGENCE PERCEPTIONS SOMEHOW REPRESENT A VICTORY OF THE "B" TEAM OVER A RELUCTANT BUT FINALLY OVERWHELMED GROUP OF INSTITUTIONALLY-BIASED ANALYSTS AND ESTIMATORS IN THE CIA. TO THIS END, HE HAS RECENTLY SPOKEN ON "FACE THENATION" AND PLANS TO INCLUDE A {CLASSIFIED} LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL WITH EACH COPY OF NIE 11-3/8-76 STRESSING THE INTEGRITY OF THE ANALYTICAL AND ESTIMATING PROCES. E2, IMPDET. H

\* Reference is Top Secret.

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GEORGE BUSH/DCI

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RICHARD LEHMAN  
D/DCI/NI

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